Santa Clara, California

Apoorve Bhargava

Software Engineer III, Security @ Cohesity

I work on data and identity security — detecting and responding to threats against the identity systems enterprises depend on. Before Cohesity I spent nearly two years at AWS License Manager building the compliance and asset-governance infrastructure that enterprise and federal customers run on.

Outside work I research the recovery half of AI supply chain security: what an operator actually does once a model or dataset turns out to be compromised.

Apoorve Bhargava

Research

Recovery from compromised AI model supply chains

Independent work, with a published preprint and a reproducible implementation.

Beyond Detection: A Recovery-Oriented Architecture for Compromised AI Model Remediation

Preprint · September 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · 16 pages

AI supply chain security has matured at the point of adoption: model signing, provenance documentation and static scanning all answer whether an artifact is what it claims to be. None answers the question that arises when that trust is later overturned — given an artifact now known to be compromised, which deployed models descend from it, and what can be done about each one.

The paper argues this is a graph reachability problem rather than a cryptographic one, gives a formal model of how compromise propagates across a typed lineage graph, and builds a recovery planner that classifies every affected artifact by whether rollback to a clean, signed ancestor is actually available.

  • Two proofs. A blast radius computed over an incompletely recorded graph is a sound lower bound on true exposure, so the query never over-reports; and any rollback target the planner proposes lies outside the true blast radius, even though the planner never sees that graph.
  • Partial records mislead in a measurable way. The rate at which artifacts are wrongly declared unrecoverable grows superlinearly in the detection miss rate, while the count grows sublinearly — so claims about operational cost are claims about the count, not the rate.
  • Attestation coverage is a poor security metric. An adversary who withholds attestations near the compromise, rather than losing them at random, halves recall at an identical recording budget.
Bhargava, A. (2026). Beyond Detection: A Recovery-Oriented Architecture for Compromised AI Model Remediation. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22729426

Try it: where does a compromise actually reach?

Each box is a model. Arrows run parent to child, the direction contamination travels. Click a model to say it was found compromised, and the blast radius lights up along with what can be done about each affected artifact. Then click an arrow to delete it — that is a derivation nobody wrote down, and it is the situation the paper is about.

Reading

Click any model to begin.

Verdicts

compromised affected can roll back clean ◆ signed

Artifact

model-lineage-recovery

Python · NetworkX · Apache-2.0

The full implementation and evaluation, about 1,500 lines. A typed lineage DAG, a blast-radius query, and a recovery planner. The entire study reproduces from a clean clone in roughly thirteen seconds, and a checker validates every number in the paper against the published results.

In progress

Real lineage at hub scale

Hugging Face · Coverage measurement

The next step is to stop simulating the graph and measure the real one. Model hubs already publish base-model tags, adapter configs, quantization variants and merge parents. Assembling those and measuring how much of the true derivation graph is actually declared is a number nobody has published.

Experience

Where I've worked

Six years across cloud infrastructure, distributed systems and security. Pick a role.

Software Engineer III — Security

Aug 2026 – Present

Cohesity · San Jose, CA

  • Identity threat detection and response, covering the identity providers enterprises actually run on — Entra ID, Okta, Ping and Active Directory.
  • Working on detection and attack-path analysis across identity systems, where the questions are close to my own research: reachability over a typed graph of security-relevant relationships.

Skills

Technical stack

What I build with, across cloud infrastructure, distributed systems and security.

Languages

JavaPythonGo TypeScriptC++SQL

Cloud & infrastructure

AWSDynamoDBLambda EventBridgeGlueECS S3IAMSageMaker

Security

Identity (Entra ID, Okta)Active Directory Attack path analysisSupply chain integrity Anomaly detectionSigstore / in-toto

Frameworks & tools

Spring BootKafkaDocker KubernetesNetworkXPostgreSQL

Projects

Built outside work

Things I built from scratch to solve a problem I actually had.

Open source

StackStorm — real-time metrics pipeline

Python · Distributed systems

StackStorm is an open-source automation platform used across cloud data centres. I built integrations piping 30,000+ live operational metrics from monitoring agents into the platform in real time, and contributed the improvements upstream.

Machine learning

AI vs. human text detector

Python · SageMaker · S3

A classifier that distinguishes human writing from generated text, trained and deployed end to end on AWS — from raw data ingestion through to live prediction. Built in response to concerns about generated content in academic settings.

Backend

High-volume event analytics API

Python · Flask · PostgreSQL · Docker

An API handling over 100,000 events a day, designed to scale horizontally with rate limiting and background job processing so nothing blocks the request path.

Contact

Get in touch

Happy to talk about AI supply chain security, identity threat detection, or the research above.